Archive for 2018

Dependable and Secure Machine Learning

Saturday, July 7th, 2018

I co-organized, with Homa Alemzadeh and Karthik Pattabiraman, a workshop on trustworthy machine learning attached to DSN 2018, in Luxembourg: DSML: Dependable and Secure Machine Learning.

Cybersecurity Summer Camp

Saturday, July 7th, 2018

I helped organize a summer camp for high school teachers focused on cybersecurity, led by Ahmed Ibrahim. Some of the materials from the camp on cryptography, including the Jefferson Wheel and visual cryptography are here: Cipher School for Muggles.




Cybersecurity Goes to Summer Camp. UVA Today. 22 July 2018. [archive.org]

Earlier this week, 25 high school teachers – including 21 from Virginia – filled a glass-walled room in Rice Hall, sitting in high adjustable chairs at wheeled work tables, their laptops open, following a lecture with graphics about the dangers that lurk in cyberspace and trying to figure out how to pass the information on to a generation that seems to share the most intimate details of life online. “I think understanding privacy is important to that generation that uses Facebook and Snapchat,” said David Evans, a computer science professor who helped organize the camp. “We hope to give teachers some ideas and tools to get their students excited about learning about cryptography, privacy and cybersecurity, and how these things can impact them.”

(Also excerpted in ACM TechNews, 29 June 2018.)




UVa bootcamp aims to increase IT training for teachers. The Daily Progress. 22 June 2018. [archive.org]

DLS Keynote: Is “adversarial examples” an Adversarial Example?

Tuesday, May 29th, 2018

I gave a keynote talk at the 1st Deep Learning and Security Workshop (co-located with the 39th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy). San Francisco, California. 24 May 2018




Abstract

Over the past few years, there has been an explosion of research in security of machine learning and on adversarial examples in particular. Although this is in many ways a new and immature research area, the general problem of adversarial examples has been a core problem in information security for thousands of years. In this talk, I’ll look at some of the long-forgotten lessons from that quest and attempt to understand what, if anything, has changed now we are in the era of deep learning classifiers. I will survey the prevailing definitions for “adversarial examples”, argue that those definitions are unlikely to be the right ones, and raise questions about whether those definitions are leading us astray.

SRG at IEEE S&P 2018

Tuesday, May 29th, 2018

Group Dinner


Including our newest faculty member, Yongwhi Kwon, joining UVA in Fall 2018!

Yuan Tian, Fnu Suya, Mainuddin Jonas, Yongwhi Kwon, David Evans, Weihang Wang, Aihua Chen, Weilin Xu

Poster Session


Fnu Suya (with Yuan Tian and David Evans), Adversaries Don’t Care About Averages: Batch Attacks on Black-Box Classifiers [PDF]

Mainuddin Jonas (with David Evans), Enhancing Adversarial Example Defenses Using Internal Layers [PDF]

Huawei STW: Lessons from the Last 3000 Years of Adversarial Examples

Wednesday, May 23rd, 2018

I spoke on Lessons from the Last 3000 Years of Adversarial Examples at Huawei’s Strategy and Technology Workshop in Shenzhen, China, 15 May 2018.

We also got to tour Huawei’s new research and development campus, under construction about 40 minutes from Shenzhen. It is pretty close to Disneyland, with its own railroad and villages themed after different European cities (Paris, Bologna, etc.).



Huawei’s New Research and Development Campus [More Pictures]

Unfortunately, pictures were not allowed on our tour of the production line. Not so surprising that nearly all of the work was done by machines, but was surprising to me how much of the human work left is completely robotic. The human workers (called “operators”) are mostly scanning QR codes on parts, and following the directions that light up with they do, or scanning bins and following directions on a screen to collect parts from bins and scanning them when they are put into the bin. This is the kind of system that leads to remarkably high production quality. The parts are mostly delivered on tapes that are fed into the machines, and many machines along the line are primarily for testing. There is a “bottleneck” marker that is placed on any points that are holding up the production line.

The public (at least to the factory) “grapey board” keeps track of the happiness of the workers — each operator puts up a smiley (or frowny) face on the board to show their mood for the day, monitored carefully by the managers. There is a batch of grapes to show performance for the month. If an operator does something good, a grape is colored green; if they do something bad, a grape is colored black. There was quite a bit of discussion among the people on the tour (mostly US and European-based professors) if such a management approach would be a good idea for our research groups… (or for department chairs for their faculty!)



In front of Huawei’s “White House”, with Battista Biggio [More Pictures]

Feature Squeezing at NDSS

Sunday, February 25th, 2018

Weilin Xu presented Feature Squeezing: Detecting Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural Networks at the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium 2018. San Diego, CA. 21 February 2018.



Paper: Weilin Xu, David Evans, Yanjun Qi. Feature Squeezing: Detecting Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural Networks. NDSS 2018. [PDF]

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